| Matches |
Pre Match |
|
Pre Match |
|
Pre Match |
|
Overall |
|
Favourite |
|
Favourite |
|
Favourite |
|
Success |
|
Wins Set |
|
Breaks First |
|
Goes Set & Break Down
first |
Rate % |
|
|
|
|
|
Recovers It |
|
|
|
Set 2 |
|
Set 2 |
|
Set 2 |
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
52.78 |
|
46.53 |
|
62.34 |
|
79.86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 144 |
76 |
68 |
67 |
77 |
48 |
29 |
|
So, from 144 matches, in 79.86% of scenarios the underdog did not train to 1.01.
Actually this figure should be slightly higher, as there were also some examples were the pre-match underdog staved off multiple break points, from scores like 0-40 or 15-40 either when the set was on serve, or from a set and break up, and this would have fairly large positive price movement for the pre-match favourite.
One example of this was the Angieszka Radwanska vs Dominika Cibulkova semi-final at the Australian Open on January 23rd, 2014. Cibulkova took the first set 6-1, and led 4-0 in set 2. At this point traders that stuck with Radwanska would be staring a loss in the face, but the Pole broke for *1-4 and held for 2-4*. In this next game, Cibulkova held despite going 0-30 and it is highly likely that traders who had held their position, and averaged down their position a set and break down would have been able to scratch at least, if not exit for slight profit at 0-30.
However, these weren’t quantified and for purposes of analysis I’ll use the 79.86% figure for ‘non trains’ although I actually expect this percentage to be slightly higher, probably around the 82-83% mark. There was also one match, between Na Li and Barbora Zahlavova-Strycova, where there were no breaks in set 2 and it went to a tie-break.
What may surprise some readers is the low percentage that the pre-match favourite actually won the second set when they lost the first set – just 52.78%. However, when backing the pre-match favourite when a set down, you don’t necessarily need them to win the set – merely to have decent price movement in the direction you require according to your script is enough.
Also, the pre-match favourite didn’t even manage to take the first break in the set half the time, with the pre-match underdog going a set and break up on 77/144 occasions (53.47%).
Having said this, the pre-match favourite’s performance from a set and break down was incredible. They recovered this deficit to get the set back on serve 48/77 times (62.34%) and this percentage is stellar – 18.37% above the 43.97% WTA average and this 62.34% percentage is also higher than ANY individual WTA player’s break-back percentage over the last 12 months.
So, how does this allow us to formulate a trading plan?
Let’s assume the following (the worst case scenario):-
1) We laid Bacsinszky when a break up at *2-1 and hedged for profit when Wozniacki broke for 3-3.
2) We then laid again when she led by a break again at *5-4 and lost when she served the set out.
This probably gave us a small losing position if we were to equal hedge, but instead of this we can add to our lay of Bacsinszky by doing so again at the start of set two. We now know that in almost 80% of matches we get a chance to hedge for profit at some point, and are able to scratch trade a few percent more as well.
In this spot, Wozniacki broke first after the previously mentioned scary moments where the market was clearly getting nervy, and we can, at that point, either equally hedge for profit, or at least clear liability on the Dane and look for the big market flip. The markets generally love the set two winner prior to a deciding set so this isn’t a bad strategy whatsoever.
In the Sharapova vs Bacsinszky match, Bacsinszky actually took a tiebreak to win the first set and didn’t lead by a break, so a back of Sharapova when a set down would have yielded immediate dividends when she broke for *1-0 in the first game of set two.
In either of these matches, should Bacsinszky actually have broken first in set two, we can average down our lay price by laying her when a set and break up, knowing that the pre-match favourite’s record for recovering break deficits is magnificent from this situation.
Holding positions and averaging down lay prices requires a high degree of courage and mental strength, but with detailed knowledge of the numbers involved in previous similar scenarios, this allows us to keep a level head, knowing that in around 80% of matches we will be able to trade out for significant profit.
Finally, on the subject of ‘averaging down’, I notice that many financial websites do not advise this style of trading.
However, with the financial markets, it’s highly unlikely that investors do not know when the optimal times are to re-enter the market again, and may re-enter incorrectly. Furthermore, it’s also much more difficult, if not impossible, to equate the likelihood of a position rising again.
In the sports trading markets, it’s different. Analysing historical scenarios allows us to apply the percentage of outcomes (the likelihood of a swing back in the market) to the various key situations of a tennis match and these can tell us when to enter, and average down, to good effect.